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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES—AND DEFENDANT DID 
NOT DISPUTE BELOW—THAT POLICE LAWFULLY 
ENTERED THE APARTMENT AT WHICH POINT THEY 
SMELLED BURNT MARIJUANA AND WITNESSED 
MARIJUANA AND PARAPHERNALIA IN PLAIN VIEW. 
Somewhat oddly, defendant spends much time and effort attacking the most obviously 
appropriate and lawful aspects of the search—the officers' attempt to investigate a reported 
robbery and their entry into the apartment where they were immediately exposed to telltale 
signs of drug use, e.g., the smell of burnt marijuana as well as baggies of marijuana and 
paraphernalia in plain view. "[I]n this case the prosecutor presented no facts to support, and 
no argument regarding, the officers' initial warrantless search of items in the apartment in 
plain view or otherwise." Aple. Br. at 21-22. This claim is plainly wrong. 
A. Defendant Did Not Challenge the Officer's Entry into the 
Apartment, Which Was Clearly Justified As Part of Their 
Investigation of a Reported Robbery and the Suspicious Actions of 
the Two Men with the Duffle Bag. 
Defendant claims on appeal the police officers' entry into the home was "unlawful." 
Aple. Br. at 18. "Since the challenge in the motion to suppress related to the initial 
warrantless search (see R. 61-63; 107:12-14), it was incumbent upon the state to establish 
that it was lawful." Aple. Br. at 21. 
This claim fails because the motion to suppress did not challenge the initial 
warrantless entry into the apartment. Instead, the exclusive focus of defendant's two-
paragraph argument was the propriety of the search of the duffle bag. See, e.g., R. 62-63. 
Although at the suppression hearing, defendant's counsel belatedly asserted that there was 
"reason to suggest that the entry itself into the home was unlawful," he acknowledged that he 
was not prepared and was unable to offer any evidence suggesting that the officers' entry 
into the home was anything but lawful. R. 107:13-14. Thus, defendant has failed to create 
any genuine hurdle for the State to overcome concerning the initial entry into the apartment. 
But even crediting defendant's meager challenge to the initial entry as something 
more than an afterthought, there is nonetheless ample record support for police actions. The 
Search Affidavit, R. 73-75 and State's Exhibit 1, which was cited at page 14 of the State's 
2 
Opening Brief, l makes the justifications for police entry into the apartment abundantly 
clear—so clear, in fact, that defendant never offered any evidence or authority to the trial 
court to suggest that the entry was unlawful. The Search Affidavit states: 
On the evening of October 11,2005 Salt Lake City Police Officers responded 
to the listed apartment on a possible robbery in progress call. The female 
complain[an]t was at the listed address in apartment A. Apartment A is below 
apartment C. She said that she heard people upstairs in the above apartment. 
She then saw three males leaving apartment C and running away. One of [the] 
males was wearing a ski mask. When Police Officers arrived a short time 
later, they heard yelling coming from the listed apartment. The Officers then 
saw a male adult coming out of the listed apartment. He was wearing a 
stocking cap and carrying a duffel bag. Police Officer[s] challenged the male 
and he ran back into the apartment. Police Officers knocked on the apartment 
door and the persons inside said everything is ok but they would not open the 
door. Police Officers then observed the male who was carrying the duffel bag 
go out the back door onto a balcony. Someone from inside the apartment 
handed the male the duffel bag. Police Officers challenge[d] the male again. 
The male dropped the duffel bag and went back into the apartment. Police 
Officer told the persons inside the apartment that they needed to come in and 
verify that everything is ok. Officers told the persons in the apartment to open 
the door or they would kick it in. The persons inside the apartment then let the 
police into the apartment. 
The Police Officers who went into the apartment could smell a strong smell of 
fresh burnt marijuana in the apartment. They observed a small baggie of a 
green leafy substance in plain view on a couch. Officers found that duffel bag 
the male dropped on the balcony contained large amounts of a green leafy 
substance that appears to be marijuana. The Officers also observed that a 
1
 In his opposing brief, page 32, defendant claims that the State is improperly 
attempting to assert on appeal, "without reference to the record," that police had reasonable 
suspicion to enter the apartment. This claim is puzzling given that the State's Opening Brief 
explicitly cites to record, specifically the Affidavit for Search Warrant, signed by Detective 
Doug Teerlink and dated October 12,2005 ("Search Affidavit"), R. 74, where Det. Teerlink 
recounts the reported robbery and the suspicious behavior of the two men with the duffle 
bag. 
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mirror had been knocked off the wall near the balcony and some money 
hidden behind it. 
R. 74. The Search Affidavit was received into evidence without objection from defendant. 
R. 107:11. Because the factual and legal bases for the officers' entry into the apartment were 
never challenged below, and because the officers' concerns about the reported robbery and 
the suspicious behavior of the men with the duffle bag were so obviously reasonable, 
defendant cannot now claim the entry was unlawful. See generally Warden, Md. Penitentiary 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (finding warrantless entry into home justified by 
exigent circumstances where witnesses told officers that suspect ran into the residence less 
than five minutes before the officers' arrival). 
B. Once Inside the Apartment, Police Officers Were Justified in 
Investigating Clear Indications of Drug Use—The "Plain Smell" of 
Burnt Marijuana and the Existence of Paraphernalia and Baggies 
of Marijuana in "Plain View." 
Defendant seems to think that the officers' initial entry into the apartment, their 
immediate awareness of the plain smell of marijuana and their observation of baggies of 
marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view was a "warrantless search." It was not. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "observations by law enforcement of activity in 'open view5 
from a position 'lawfully accessible to the public' do not infringe upon an individual's 
'reasonable expectation of privacy,' and thus do not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment." Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, ^  24,44 P.3d 767 (citing State v. Lee, 
633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)) (emphasis added); see also LaFave, Wayne R, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment, § 2.2 (4th ed. 2004) ("As a general 
4 
proposition, it is fair to say that when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something 
by utilization of one or more of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where 
those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a 'search5 within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment"). The officers demanded and were eventually granted entry into the 
home to investigate a possible robbery—a possibility that was bolstered by the furtive and 
evasive actions of the men with the duffle bag. Defendant has never disputed the officers' 
account or presented any evidence to suggest that the officers' actions were not justified. 
The record clearly establishes that the officers made their plain view/smell observations from 
a lawful vantage point and no further justification, legal or factual, is required. 
II. THE STATE PRESERVED ITS FRANKS CLAIM BY ARGUING 
TO THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SEARCH AFFIDAVIT 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE EVEN 
WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE FROM THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Defendant claims that "the [S]tate has raised the Franks doctrine here for the first 
time on appeal." Aple. Br. at 23 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). Thus, 
according to defendant, the State may argue Franks on appeal only by showing plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 24. Because the State has not claimed plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, the argument goes, its Franks argument cannot succeed. Id. 
Here, defendant makes what is essentially a semantic point. It is true that the State's 
briefing before the trial court did not include an explicit reference to "the Franks doctrine." 
However, the State clearly invoked the Franks remedy when it argued that "there was 
probable cause for a warrant even without the information describing the contents of the 
5 
duffel bag" and "even if this court were to hold that the search of the duffel bag could not be 
used as a basis for the probable cause, the remaining information in the affidavit provides 
probable cause on which to issue a warrant." R. 68-69. This prosecutor's request that the 
court review the affidavit without the offending information describes precisely what the trial 
court was authorized to do and should have done under Franks and its progeny after it 
determined that the marijuana discovered in the duffle bag had to be suppressed. As argued 
in the State's Opening Brief, "when faced with a warrant containing information obtained 
pursuant to an illegal search, a reviewing court must excise the offending information and 
evaluate whether what remains is sufficient to establish probable cause." United States v. 
Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359, 367 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing Franks requirements in light of 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)). 
Defendant also claims that there was no basis for redacting the affidavit under Franks 
because the State did not allege that it contained false information. Aple. Br. at 24. In 
Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that a search warrant that is based on 
"deliberate falsehoods" or a "reckless disregard of the truth" must be evaluated to determine 
if it still supports probable cause once the false information is removed. Franks, 438 U.S at 
171-72. According to defendant, because there was no claim that the Search Affidavit 
contained "deliberate falsehoods" or a "reckless disregard for the truth," Franks is 
inapplicable. 
But defendant confuses the Franks holding with what has evolved through subsequent 
caselaw into what is now called "the Franks doctrine" or "the Franks remedy." The Franks 
6 
remedy, unlike the more narrow Franks holding, endorses a procedure through which a court 
determines whether an affidavit still supports probable cause once information concerning 
illegally obtained evidence is removed. See State's Opening Br. at 12-13 (citing, numerous 
cases from various jurisdictions discussing the "Franks doctrine" as a means of redacting 
information concerning illegally obtained evidence). Thus, the Search Affidavit need not 
contain false information to be eligible for the Franks remedy. On the contrary, the State has 
argued that the trial court should have excised statements concerning the marijuana in the 
duffle bag—statements that were entirely truthful and accurate—and then determined 
whether the redacted warrant was sufficient to support probable cause. 
In sum, the State raised the Franks doctrine in its explicit request that the trial court 
determine whether the Search Affidavit still supported probable cause when the information 
concerning the 32 pounds of marijuana from the duffle bag was redacted. Had the court 
done so, it would have or at least should have found that the affidavit was sufficient and 
denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
III. DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES THE STATE'S USE OF 
RELEVANT AUTHORITY AS BACKGROUND TO EXPLAIN 
THE RATIONALE FOR THE FRANKS DOCTRINE AND ITS 
APPLICABILITY IN THIS CASE. 
In his brief, defendant spends several pages critiquing the applicability of "inevitable 
discovery rule" and the "the independent source rule," ultimately concluding that neither has 
any applicability in this case." Aple. Br. at 26-31. Unfortunately, this analysis is completely 
superfluous because the State did not suggest that those doctrines were applicable to this 
7 
case. In fact, the State never mentions the inevitable discovery rule and refers to independent 
source only once in a parenthetical. 
Defendant incorrectly infers that the State was invoking the inevitable discovery rule 
through citation to Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See Aple. Br. at 26. It is true that 
Nix sanctions the admissibility of otherwise suppressible evidence "if the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. However, the State did not cite 
Nix to support or advocate application of the inevitable discovery rule in this case. Rather, 
the State refers to Mr only to introduce the Franks doctrine by explaining the general 
rationale for admitting otherwise tainted evidence where suppression "would operate to 
undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would have 
occupied without any police misconduct." See State's Opening Br. at 11-12 (citingNix, 567 
U.S. at 447). Here, the State advocates the application of Franks to put the police in the 
same position they would have been if they had not opened the duffle bag—i.e., in 
possession of plain smell and plain view evidence of marijuana use and possession which 
was sufficient to support probable cause for a warrant. Because the trial court erroneously 
failed to make that determination, this Court should at minimum remand for further 
proceedings. 
Next, defendant turns to the independent source doctrine. Here, again, defendant 
faults the State for not properly briefing an issue it did not raise. Aple. Br. at 30-31. The 
State is not asking this Court to determine whether the 32 pounds of marijuana would 
8 
ultimately be deemed admissible under the independent source doctrine. Rather, the State is 
arguing that it is entitled to a determination by the trial court as to whether the redacted 
Search Affidavit supported probable cause for the search. See State's Opening Br. at 13-14. 
The trial court erred in failing to do so. This error requires reversal or, at minimum, remand 
to the trial court for consideration of whether the redacted warrant is valid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully that this Court reverse the trial 
court's suppression of the evidence of 32 pounds of marijuana found in the duffle bag. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of March, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
1CL04 £ . Q j 2 ^ £ r 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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